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A major labour market challenge following the Great Recession is to avoid an
increase in long-term unemployment and thus the structural unemployment rate.
Active labour market policies may play an important role in this respect. We consider
these issues with outset in Denmark which is a country relying extensively on active
labour market policies. It is also characterised by high flows into and out of
employment, implying that most unemployment spells are rather short and the
unemployment rate is relative low. These features have been maintained despite the
crisis, and in this sense the Danish flexicurity model has coped reasonably well with
the crisis. The Danish active labour market policies have been continuously changed
in light of experience, new knowledge and changes in the labour market situation.
This paper reviews and discusses these changes in light of the recession and
considers how the labour market has coped with the recession.
Keywords: Active labour market policy, Long-term unemployment, Great recession
JEL codes: J60, J38, E321. Introduction
The great recession has had a large labour market impact causing a steep decrease in
employment rates. For a given macroeconomic background and policy setting the
overriding task for labour market policies is to reduce the extent to which the rise in
unemployment translates into an increase in long-term unemployment and thus the
structural unemployment rate. Experience from the high unemployment period in the
1970s and 1980s shows both how steep increases in unemployment can translate into
increases in the structural unemployment and how difficult it may be to bring down
the structural unemployment rate subsequently.
Active labour market policies may play an important role in this context. However,
how should active labour market policies (ALMP) be designed so as to reach this ob-
jective in a very slack labour market? This raises several issues. First, there is a volume
effect. For given ALMP policies an increase in unemployment causes a larger inflow
into the ALMP programmes. This raises both a funding and a capacity issue. Can such
an increased level of activity be funded? How fast can the supply capacity in ALMP
programmes be expanded. A particular concern is that the quality or effectiveness may
be decreasing in the overall activity level e.g. because private job training (one of the
instruments which is usually found to be most effective) may be in shorter supply. Sec-
ond, the composition of the pool of unemployed may change. In a situation with low
unemployment, the group is dominated by individuals who face more serious barriers2012 Andersen and Svarer; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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different level or type of ALMP programmes? Thirdly, is the effect of ALMP policies
business cycle dependent? There are two sides to this question since ALMP serves both
to strengthen search incentives and to improve qualifications to enhance job finding
possibilities. A slump may at the same time reduce the importance of the incentive
problem and increase the importance of the qualification problem. The former because
unemployment benefits may be less distortionary in a slump and hence the need to
maintain search incentives via ALMP is accordingly smaller. The latter because a deep
recession is associated with structural changes and therefore some core workers may
find that their human capital to some degree becomes obsolete. Finally, the political
support for ALMP may be business cycle dependent. It may seem more reasonable to
have tight ALMP conditions when unemployment is low and job finding rates are high,
and the opposite with high unemployment and low job finding rates.
We consider some of these questions with outset in the Danish experiences and pol-
icy responses to the great recession. The Danish case is interesting due to the role
ALMP plays in the so-called flexicurity model (see e.g. Andersen and Svarer (2007)).
The Danish labour market has flexible hiring and firing rules, relatively generous un-
employment insurance benefits and a strong focus on ALMP (highest among OECD
countries 1). At the same time it has delivered a rather low unemployment rate. How
well has this model coped with the great recession, and how have ALMP policies been
adapted to the crisis?
Denmark is also an example of how ALMP has been continuously changed. Even
though the overall level measured in terms of expenditures as a share of GDP has been
relatively constant over the years, the specific design of ALMP has changed significantly
over the years in response to the labour market situation, new evidence on the effects
of ALMP and changes in political prioritizations.
Clearly it is not possible from one observation (and even a relatively short observa-
tion period) to make a reliable inference on how a recession influences the effectiveness
of ALMP. The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the insights which can be in-
ferred so far from the Danish case. The paper provides a discussion of how ALMP has
been changed in light of the recession as well as new evidence and insights on how it
works. The focus will thus be on some policy issues and lessons.
This paper is organized as follows: The developments in the Danish labour market since
the onset of the Great Recession are mapped in Section 2, followed by a more detailed ac-
count of active labour market policies in Section 3. Active labour market policies have
been continuously changed in light of experience and new evidence, and in Section 4 we
discuss some recent randomized experiments, their findings and influence on labour mar-
ket policies. The management structure of labour market policies have recently been
changed according to a one-shop principle at the municipal level, and the issues this has
raised are discussed in Section 5. A few concluding remarks are given in Section 6.2. Labour market response to the crisis
Prior to the Great Recession the Danish economy was booming and the unemployment
rate reached record low levels, cf. Figure 1. However, at the eve of the crisis there were




















































Figure 1 Unemployment, Denmark and OECD, 1991–2011.
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tern. Although unemployment has increased steeply in recent years 2, it is noteworthy
that unemployment remains below the OECD average.
A particular feature of the Danish flexicurity model is a very high level of churning in
the labour market; that is, both the level of inflows and outflows from jobs are high. As
a consequence job tenure is relatively low in international comparison, and most un-
employment spells are rather short.
It is seen from Figure 2 that the boom period preceding the Great Recession was ac-
companied by a steep increase in the employment inflow rate, but also in the outflow
rate (though there was net job creation). Shortage of labour caused intense bidding for
workers and induced higher job mobility as well as accelerated wage increases. The
Great Recession was on impact associated with a sharp drop in the inflow rate, and it
has later returned to its historical level. The outflow rate remained high and has later
fallen to its historical level. The increase in unemployment has thus been associated
with both a high outflow rate and a low inflow rate. It is noteworthy that the levels of
inflow and outflow rates are back at their historical levels. Hence, even in the midst of
the recession a very high level of job turnover remains a key feature of the Danish
labour market implying that there are jobs to search.
It is a consequence of the high turnover rates that most unemployment spells are ra-
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Figure 3 Open unemployment – numbers affected and average duration of unemployment spells,
2004–2012.
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ation decreased, and it has later increased, but it remains at a rather low level. It is a
consequence that the ratio of persons experiencing unemployment during the year rela-
tive to the number of unemployed in full-time equivalents is rather high, cf. Figure 3.
Interestingly this ratio has followed an inverse U-pattern suggesting a substantial reallo-
cation of labour during the recession.
The high rate of job turnover in the Danish labour market can be interpreted as pro-
viding implicit work sharing 3. Rather than having unemployment concentrated on a
smaller group, many are affected, but most of them only for a short period. This “rota-
tion” ensures that most unemployed maintain contact with the labour market avoiding
depreciation of human capital. As such it should contribute to lower the risk that the
higher unemployment rate translates into an increase in long-term unemployment. Al-
though long-term unemployment has increased, the increase is relatively small com-
pared to the increase in unemployment in general, see Figure 4).
A further crucial implication of the high level of job turnover is that it also facilitates
entry into the labour market for youth. The level of job-openings is relatively high, even
in the midst of the recession, and that is beneficial for youth. Youth unemployment has
increased in Denmark (for the age group 15–24 it has increased from about 6% to


























































Figure 4 Long-term unemployed, 2007–2012.
Andersen and Svarer IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:7 Page 5 of 19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/7The initial employment decline was concentrated in the private sector, particularly
building and industry. As a consequence males where more affected than females. The
shifting gender composition is rather striking, c.f. Figure 5. Later the private sector has
recovered somewhat while the public sector has experienced some labour adjustment,
and this explains the convergence between males and females. Due to the lower level of
hiring youth, unemployment increased.3. Active labour market policies
To explain active labour market policies in Denmark a few institutional details are in
order. Unemployment insurance 4 is a voluntary scheme based on membership fees
and tax-financed subsidies. Persons not eligible for UIB are eligible for Social Assist-
ance (means tested on a family basis).
All unemployed are categorized in so-called match groups based on an overall assess-
ment (qualifications, experience, social situation etc.) of the potential for the individual
to be employed. Earlier the system had five groups, now it has three match-groups 5.
The system applies to all on unemployment benefits, social assistance, sickness-
payment, flex-job etc.
 Group I (job-ready): Individuals with no problems except unemployment. A person
who is available for a job and who can become self-supportive within 3 months.
 Group II (ready for activity): Individual who is not at present ready to start
working, but is capable of participating in a programme activity aiming at later
employment.
 Group III(temporarily passive): A person who is neither ready for a job nor for
participation in a programme activity aiming at later employment.
Individuals on UIB are automatically in group I. The rules for ALMP reviewed below
apply to all individuals (whether on UIB, SA or other forms of transfer) in match group
I. In the following we distinguish between unemployed entitled to unemployment in-
surance benefits – UI unemployed – and unemployed entitled to social assistance and
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Figure 5 New unemployment spells, 2004–2012.
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design has been under more or less continuous change. The current system has two
key elements (contact and activation):
 Contact: An unemployed (whether on UIB or SA) has to make a CV available on
the job centre website within the first four weeks as unemployed, and he/she must
participate in interviews on job search and labour market availability at the job centre
at least every 3rd month.
 Unemployed have a right and duty to activation after 9 months of unemployment
(duration variable, see below), and thereafter every 6 months.
 For youths there are special rules:– Below the age of 30: First interview within one month, thereafter every 3
months.
– Below the age of 30: First activation (right and duty) after 3 months (duration at
least 6 months). If the person does not have an education, the activation
programme should be aiming at education in the ordinary educational system.
– Below the age of 25 without education and dependent children: mandatory
education; if not immediately suited for enrolment in the ordinary education
system, activation should focus on improving the pre-conditions making this
possible at a later stage. For individuals with a labour market relevant education,
the activation should focus on enhancing the scope for ordinary work.
– Immediate activation of the very young (age-group 18+19). Some municipalities
have introduced immediate and full-time activation for very young individuals
claiming SA.All unemployed eligible for unemployment benefits have, at their own discretion, a
right to 6 weeks education (retaining UI benefits during participation). The type of edu-
cation is an individual choice but the possibility set depends on the previous education
record. Most educational activities are within the system of “labour market educations”
(AMU) offering skill-specific short-term courses. The educational activity should be in
the first 9 months (persons above age 25) or 6 months (persons below age 25) of an un-
employment spell. Of the total number of persons eligible for unemployment benefits
in 2010, 13% used this education option 6. This programme has not yet been evaluated.
The degree of activation (number of people in programmes relative to the relevant
target group) and the average duration are shown in Figure 5 for both UIB- and
SA-unemployed. It is slightly above 20% for the UIB-unemployed and 35-40% for
the SA-unemployed. The average duration of programme activities is slightly longer
(14–15 weeks) for UIB-unemployed than for SA-unemployed (10–11 weeks). It is
noteworthy that the level of activation has been maintained despite the increase in
unemployment (Figure 6).
The programme types are illustrated in Figure 7. Since the activation rates have
been maintained and unemployment has increased, it follows for all types of pro-
grammes that there has been an absolute increase in the number of participants.
Counselling and qualification activities as well as employment with wage subsid-
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Figure 6 Activation rate and average duration of activation activities – UI and SA unemployed.
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relative importance.
It is noteworthy that the level of ALMP measured by activation rates for the un-
employed has been maintained despite the crisis and the increase in unemployment.
This is reflected in a clear counter-cyclical pattern for the expenditures on ALMP, cf.
Figure 8.4. Changes in ALMP-instruments
ALMP is continuously adjusted in light of the labour market situation and new evi-
dence. In recent years ALMP has shifted more towards focus on job search, counselling
and sanctions. This reflects an adaptation to new research results – some based on nat-
ural experiments. We will account for the changes in ALMP and the empirical research
motivating these changes.
In recent years there has been a remarkable focus on implementing evidence based
labour market policies in Denmark. In 2005 the Danish Labour Market Board initiated
the first randomized experiment to test the effectiveness of conducting an intensified
programme for newly unemployed. The initiative – which is described in more detailed
below – not only led to changes in the active labour market policy, but also started a
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Figure 8 Unemployment and ALMP expenditures, 2004–2010.
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induced changes in the design of the active labour market policies.
In this section we go through a couple of the experiments and report their main find-
ings and discuss how they have affected policy.Quick back to work – 2005–2006
The first random control experiment was conducted in two counties in Denmark dur-
ing the winter of 2005–6. All individuals in the two counties who became unemployed
during this period were randomized into a treatment group or a control group based
on their birthday. Those born on the 1st to the 15th were given the treatment, and
those born on the 16th to the 31st were not. The treatment consisted of a dramatic in-
tensification of labour market policies, involving information, very early mandatory par-
ticipation in job search assistance programmes, frequent meetings with employment
officers, and full-time programme participation in an active labour market programme
for at least three months if they had not found employment before 18 weeks of un-
employment. The unemployed were all members of UI-funds and therefore they had a
close connection to the labour market and did not in general have other problems be-
sides being unemployed. Figure 9 shows the difference in the transition rates from un-
employment for the treatment and the control group.
It is clear from the figure that the exit rate is higher for the treatment group in the
first 20 weeks of the experiment. Several authors have evaluated the experiment fur-
ther. Graversen & Van Ours (2008) use duration models to address issues of dynamic
selection and estimate the effect of the activation programme on exit rates to work.
They find that the re-employment rate increases about 30%, and this effect is the same
across age and gender. Rosholm (2008) finds similar results when estimating the effects
of the activation programme separately for both counties. Graversen & Van Ours
(2008), Rosholm (2008) and Vikström et al. (2011) all investigate which elements of the
activation programme are most effective. Graversen & Van Ours (2008) find that the
threat effect and job search assistance are most effective. A similar conclusion is drawn
by Vikström et al. (2011), who construct nonparametric bounds. Also Rosholm (2008)
finds substantial effects, but he also shows that when controlling for time-varying indi-
cators of treatment all positive effects vanish and some even become negative, the so-


























Figure 9 Transition rates out of unemployment, QBW.
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Individuals. Additional evidence for threat effects is provided by Graversen & Van Ours
(2011). They show that the effect of the activation programme is largest for individuals
with the longest travel time to the programme location. Finally, Blasco & Rosholm
(2011) analyse long-term effects on post-unemployment employment stability in terms
of duration of self-support after leaving the unemployment pool. They find that treat-
ment increases the post-unemployment self-support duration by 10% for men, while
treated women show no post-unemployment stability effects. Decomposing the effect,
they show that 20–25% is due to lagged duration dependence.
Although the intensified treatment seems to have been effective for the treated indivi-
duals, it might be at the expense of the control group. As case workers meet more
often with members of the treatment group, they may suggest job openings to them ra-
ther than to members of the control group. To investigate this congestion effect, that
is, whether the control persons in the QBW regions had a more difficult time to locate
jobs than unemployed in other regions of Denmark, Figure 10 compares the survival
rates for the treatment and control groups in the two regions that participated in QBW
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Figure 10 Survival rates from unemployment, QBW.
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unemployed in other regions of Denmark indicates that in the first 20 weeks of the ex-
periment the control group members in the QBW regions stay unemployed a little bit
longer, although the difference is quite small. Gautier et al. (2012) have taken a closer
look at the negative externality of the experiment on the control group members and
find that the job-finding rate for this group is somewhat lower and hence that the
effects reported in the first set of papers that evaluated QBW are slightly overrated.
All in all, the micro econometric evaluations of Quick Back to Work (QBW) suggest
that the intensified policy worked both in the short term when focusing on exit rates
from unemployment and in the longer term when focusing on return to employment.
In addition, a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the Danish Economic Council (2007)
demonstrated large net gains from QBW. What is more unclear is what caused these
effects of the different instruments in QBW. To evaluate this further a new experiment
was initiated in 2008. The new random control experiment was called Quick Back to
Work 2 and will be described in the next subsection.
The findings from QBW also affected labour market policies. First, the lessons that
the policy makers drew from the experiments (of course combined with other types of
input) were that early intervention was beneficial for newly unemployed, and second,
that meetings were presumably a more cost effective tool compared to other types of
interventions. As a consequence activation was moved forward from 12 months to 9
months (as described in Section 2) for unemployed above 30 years and to 3 months for
unemployed younger than 30. In addition, the first meeting for unemployed under 30
was moved forward from 3 months to after 1 month of unemployment. Although these
changes took place before the onset of the Great Recession the policies are still in
place, and although there might be reasons to soften the requirements this has not hap-
pened so far.Quick back to work 2 – 2008
As mentioned above it was somewhat unclear what caused the effects of QBW. To
evaluate this further, a new experiment was initiated in 2008. The new random control
experiment was called Quick Back to Work 2. It comprised four different experiments.
These experiments were designed in such a way that they would yield estimates of the
effects of single elements of the QBW package. The treatments consist of weekly group
meetings between a group of unemployed workers and 1–2 case workers (A), bi-weekly
individual meetings between one unemployed worker and one case worker (B), early
programme participation (C), and a combination of group meetings and early
programme participation (D).
Again, the participants were newly unemployed who were members of UI-funds. The
subjects of the experiments were individuals becoming unemployed during weeks 8–29
in 2008. The individuals were randomized into treatment or control groups based on
their date of birth. Individuals born on the 16th-31st were assigned to the treatment
groups, while those born on the 1st to the 15th were assigned to the control groups.
QBW2 has been evaluated by Pedersen et al. (2012). They find that especially the in-
dividual meetings in experiment B were effective. Figure 11 shows the accumulated dif-









































































Figure 11 The employment effect of individual meetings (experiment B).
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for both genders.
Pedersen et al. (2012) find that the meetings between newly unemployed workers and
caseworkers on average increase employment rates over the next two years by 10% cor-
responding to 5 weeks. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis shows that the surplus per
unemployed is around 4725 Euros.
The group meetings in experiment A were clearly the cheap option, and although the
effect of these was quite small, the cost benefit analysis showed a minor positive return
to these meetings.
The early activation experiment (C) showed positive effects for men, especially young
men, and especially during more favourable macroeconomic conditions, while for
women there was actually a negative effect of early activation due to locking-in effects.
The findings suggest that the effect for men arises due to a threat effect (ex-ante effect)
and more stable subsequent employment. This evidence on threat effects of early acti-
vation for men but not for women corresponds closely to results found by Rosholm &
Svarer (2008) based on register data. In addition, the cost-benefit analysis also reports a
surplus from the early activation experiment.
The final experiment that combined group meetings and early programme participa-
tion did not give a statistical significant effect and the cost-benefit analysis showed a
deficit from this experiment.
In conclusion, QBW2 confirmed that both meetings and early activation were
effective – although it also revealed that the early activation programme involved
increased costs and increased the risk of prolonging unemployment spells due to the
risk of locking-in effects.
Both QBW and QBW2 were targeted at newly unemployed. To test if the meetings
were also effective for less employable unemployed, two additional experiments were
implemented. One targeted at long-term recipients of social assistance and one at sick-
ness benefits recipients.Experiments for social assistance recipients and sickness benefits recipients
The experiment for unemployed on social assistance was implemented in 2008 and
consisted of weekly meetings for 26 weeks. The target population was unemployed on
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was randomly given to only a part of the unemployed in the job centres that partici-
pated in the experiment. The group of unemployed that participated and the control
group turned out to be unemployed with an average unemployment spell of around 4
years. The group therefore consisted of unemployed with – on average – a very loose
connection to the labour market. The experiment has been evaluated by Rosholm &
Svarer (2009), and the evaluation showed that the meetings did not lead to increased
exits to employment for the treatment group. In fact, what happened was that the in-
tensified meeting propensity led to increased activation for the group, and it appeared
that in terms of increasing employment the activation for this group was not effective
either. In total, the experiment implied a deficit of little more than 1,000 Euros per
participant.
The activation rate for this group of unemployed was in fact relatively high already,
and the findings from this experiment together with other Danish studies have led to a
significant decrease in the activation rate for unemployed with long unemployment
spells and in many cases other problems than unemployment. As a result, the persons
in group 3 7, who are labelled as temporarily passive, are no longer required to partici-
pate in activation.
The experiment for sickness benefit recipients was implemented in 2009 and targeted
at all newly registered recipients of sickness benefits. Again, the setup was a randomized
experiment and the treatment was intensified meetings and participation in activation
or other health related activities. The experiment was evaluated by Rosholm & Svarer
(2010) and the conclusion followed to a large extent the conclusion from the experiment
for social assistance recipients. The intensified treatments did not lead to higher return
rates to employment, and since the activation rate went up, the costs of the experiment
exceeded the returns and the cost benefit analysis reported a minor deficit.
In 2009 the government allowed the municipalities to use activation for recipients of
sickness benefits on the same terms as ordinary unemployed and as a consequence to
be compensated for active periods. This possibility was partly redrawn in 2011 when it
was required that only sick-listed who could not be expected to find jobs within the
next 8 weeks could be activated on these terms.Youth experiment
As in most countries youths have been disproportionally affected by the financial crisis
and the unemployment rate has risen more sharply for this group compared to older
persons. This has raised demand for more active policies towards youth unemployment.
Since many of the unemployed youth lack labour market relevant education, a dual
strategy seems appropriate. For young people with a qualifying education, the goal is to
bring them back into employment relatively fast, whereas for uneducated youths it
might be a better long-term strategy to encourage enrolment in relevant education if
they possess the relevant qualifications.
Currently the policies toward youths are already quite intensive as discussed earlier.
To test if it would be helpful with even more intensive guidance and a stronger focus
on education for uneducated youths, a randomized controlled experiment was imple-
mented in November 2009.
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further education and one for young people without further education. Both consisted
of intensified counselling. The educated group had individual weekly or biweekly meet-
ings in the first 13 weeks of the experiment, whereas the uneducated group had indi-
vidual weekly meetings for the first 32 weeks of the experiment. There was also an
increased focus on activation, especially job training, but since the group already parti-
cipated in activation quite early in the unemployment spell, there was no major differ-
ence between the activation rate in the treatment group and the control group.
The major impact of the experiments was counselling, and the evaluation (Ramböll,
2011) showed that there was a positive effect on employment rates for the educated
group and a positive effect on the exit to education for the uneducated group. For the
uneducated group the increased exit to education happened at the expense of exit to
employment. A cost-benefit analysis of the treatment for the educated group showed a
surplus of around 700 Euros per unemployed. Again, this experiment confirmed that
intensive counselling is effective – even when the labour market is in a slump.
The conclusion so far from the experiments is that counselling is effective – especially
for newly unemployed. In addition, early activation is in some cases effective since it
leads to increased search activities before actual participation. It is, however, also clear
that activation has a locking-in effect and therefore tends to prolong unemployment
spells for unemployed who participate in activation. On top of this are the costs of
running activation programmes. To decrease both the locking-in effects and the costs
of programmes there has been a shift from more expensive programmes like class-
room training to less expensive programmes like work practice, where the
unemployed has an internship at a private or public firm for on average 4 weeks on
unemployment benefits. Although it has been the intention to implement a more
work-related activation policy, it has not been implemented in the experiments in a
sufficiently clean way to allow for a test of the effectiveness of the two training
schemes against each other.
Finally as a general comment on most assessments of the effects of ALMPs it should
be noted that they do not consider general equilibrium effects arising via job creation
induced by changes in job creation rates due to changed search behaviour or wage
effects, cf. Andersen and Svarer (2012). The wage effect is potentially important since
ALMP affects not only unemployed and participants in programmes, but also employed
facing an unemployment risk.Business cycle dependent activation strategies
An important policy question is how active labour market policies should be adapted
to the business cycle situation. Although unemployment has increased in Denmark, the
active labour market policy has basically remained unchanged since the onset of the
crises in the sense that activation rates have been maintained. Clearly there has been a
lot of political debate on the issue of which instruments are most appropriate and
whether the active focus makes sense in a slack labour market.
The guidance from the economic literature on this issue is not that clear cut. There
is not much work on how labour market policies in general should be adapted to the
business cycle situation 8, and even less on active labour market policies. Andersen and
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propensity or the duration) should be made business cycle dependent in a standard
search framework. The key issue is thus the balancing of the search incentives relative
to the insurance provided, and it is found that there is a welfare case for having active
labour market policies to be pro-cyclical; that is, the conditions should be more
demanding (high incentives, duration) in a boom compared to a slump. However, this
analysis considers only the direct search effect (via the threat effect and locking-in) of
activation as it has no effects on qualifications. If qualifications are decreasing in the
duration of an unemployment spell, there is an argument for more intensive active
labour market policies during a slump to prevent this decline. This may be reinforced
to the extent that a severe business cycle downturn is associated with structural shifts,
implying that the market value of certain qualifications is depreciated significantly.
Well-targeted activation measures can thus help prevent that the rise in unemployment
translates into an increase in the structural unemployment rate. The difficult policy
issue is how to match the content of activation programmes to the characteristics of
and barriers for employment faced by the individual.
There is a small but growing literature that has investigated whether activation is
more or less efficient when unemployment increases and, in addition, which types of
activation are most efficient in economic downturns 9.
Based on a meta-study of around 100 micro econometric evaluation studies, Kluve
(2010) has investigated whether the effect of activation on labour market outcomes is
related to the unemployment rate. Kluve (2010) finds that the propensity to find a posi-
tive effect of activation is increasing in the unemployment rate and, in addition, that
the propensity to find a negative effect is decreasing in the unemployment rate. In fact,
this finding is most pronounced when he focusses on class-room training. The draw-
back of Kluve (2010) is that he does not correct for possible changes in either the com-
position of unemployed or the composition of activation choices across business cycles.
To address these issues, micro econometric analyses based on rich data sets are
needed.
In Lechner & Wunsch (2009) a German micro data set covering the period from
1984 to 2003 is used. The data has rich information on both characteristics of the un-
employed and on types of activation. Lechner & Wunsch (2009) focus on class-room
training, which - like in the Danish case - is the most used activation type in the
German active labour market system. The study applies a matching estimator that
enables control for both the composition of unemployed and activation types and finds
that the long-run effect of activation is positive in terms of improving employment
rates for the unemployed. In the short run activation decreases employment rates due
to the locking-in effect of class-room training. To shed light on the sensitivity of these
results to business cycle indicators, the effects are correlated with the unemployment
rate at the time the activation period is initiated. The article finds that the locking-in ef-
fect decreases with the unemployment rate, whereas the positive programme effect
increases. The first finding suggests that the detrimental locking-in effect of activation
is reduced when unemployment is low. Since the job finding rate is lower in economic
downturns, it appears intuitive that the costs of participating in activation are lower
when unemployment is high. It is less obvious what drives the positive programme
effect.
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vocational class-room training is affected by the aggregate unemployment rate. The
study uses Swedish data from 1999 to 2005, and like Lechner & Wunch (2009) they
use a matching estimator that enables control for both the composition of unemployed
and activation types. They find a negative locking-in effect and positive programme
effects for both types of activation and that both effects are larger for the vocational
class-room training. This implies that in the short run work practice is more effective,
whereas vocational class-room training is more effective in the longer run. When the
effects are correlated with the unemployment rate the article finds that the relative ef-
fectiveness of vocational class-room training increases in the unemployment rate. Like
in Lechner & Wunch (2009) this is related to a decreasing locking-in effect when un-
employment increases.
On Danish data two studies provide indications on the effects of activation across the
business cycle, although they are not explicitly focusing on these aspects as was the
case in the two articles mentioned above.
Staghøj et al. (2007) analyse the effect of four different kinds of activation and let the
locking-in- and programme effect vary with the unemployment rate. For class-room
training they find that the locking-in effect increases in the unemployment rate and
that the programme effect decreases. The same is true for public sector job training,
whereas they find no business cycle dependency in the effects for private sector job
training. Lauzadyte & Rosholm (2011a) estimate the effect of activation for the period
1999 to 2004. They find that the effects of activation decrease with the unemployment
rate and that this is due to a drop in the programme effects in particular. In a
Norwegian study by Røed & Raum (2006) it is found that the effect of activation in
general is less positive when unemployment increases.
Although the two first – and also most detailed – studies suggest that it is more ef-
fective to engage in class-room training when unemployment increases, there is also a
cost side to it. A Danish cost-benefit analysis by Jespersen et al. (2008) shows that
class-room training is the most expensive activation tool, and with rapidly increasing
levels of unemployment the cost side can of course question the optimal policy mix in
a situation where public funds are already rather limited. Presumably for this reason
the choice of activation type in the Danish activation policy has remained rather con-
stant since the onset of the economic crisis.5. New management system
Since 2009 the municipalities have been responsible for governing the labour market pol-
icy towards all types of unemployed and sick-listed. This indicated a change from a system
where the insured unemployed were governed by the state. The new system implies that
all unemployed are handled by one authority – the so-called one-stop shops. This system
has the apparent advantage of being simple and it benefits from economies of scale, but it
also implies that unemployed eligible for unemployment insurance are handled by the
same authority that provides assistance to unemployed on social assistance.
The new job centres are governed by the municipalities and the labour market policy
is decided by the local city councils. This basically implies 98 possibly different labour
market policy strategies, and it also runs the risk that each local job centre has a strong
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ical mobility.
The two major issues related to this therefore concern both how financial incentives
affect the policies of the municipalities and whether geographically organized job cen-
tres can provide the most relevant counselling for job seekers.
Regarding financial incentives the state has several means for affecting the actual pol-
icy conducted in the 98 different municipalities in Denmark.
The most direct instrument is compensation to the municipalities of a fraction of the
benefit payments to different categories of unemployed or sick-listed. This compensa-
tion is higher if the municipalities activate the unemployed. The most recent reform
implied that only certain types of activation lead to increased compensation. To induce
municipalities to switch from different kinds of class-room training to more work-
related activation, the compensation rate was made dependent on the type of activa-
tion. This implied that job training in public or private firms and work practice have a
higher compensation rate than if the unemployed is enrolled in e.g. a job search course.
As shown in Figure 7 this seems to have influenced activation choices.
That the design of the compensation scheme affects behaviour is more thoroughly
investigated in a report by Slotsholm (2010) evaluating a reform of the compensation
scheme. In 2006 the state changed the compensation for social assistance. Prior to the
reform the municipality was compensated directly by 50% for the social assistance pay-
ments. This was changed so that the rate of compensation was 65% when the un-
employed were activated and 35% in passive periods. Figure 12 shows the activation
rate in a sample of municipalities before and after the reform date.
As the figure suggests the activation rate increased. In the report a micro economet-
ric analysis suggests that activation increased on average by 8 per cent as a conse-
quence of the reform.6. Concluding remarks
Despite the increase in unemployment induced by the Great Recession, in- and out-
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Figure 12 Activation rate for unemployed on social assistance – before and after a reform in the
compensation system.
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but most unemployment spells are short. Although the labour market has been ad-
versely affected by the crisis the unemployment rate remains below the OECD average.
The concern that the unemployment increase would be particular steep in a country
with relatively lax employment protection and high job turnover rates has so far proven
unjustified. In this sense one may say that the Danish flexicurity labour market has
coped relatively well with the crisis.
Active labour market policies play an important role in this endeavour. There is a long
tradition of extensive use of active labour market policies in Denmark, and active labour
market policies have been maintained during the Great Recession. With the increase in
unemployment this means that there has been a volume increase in active labour market
policies. The flipside of this is an expenditure increase, but so far it has been possible to
accommodate this since there has been some fiscal space. This points to the importance
of creating fiscal space in “good times” to be able to accommodate negative shocks.
While it in the current situation may be difficult to find policy measures which signifi-
cantly can boost job creation, it is important to maintain the active focus of labour mar-
ket policies to prevent an increase in long-term and thus structural unemployment.
Active labour market policies have been changed repeatedly often based on new em-
pirical insights from natural experiments. Important lessons have been the effects of
early intervention with a focus on job search. To reduce locking-in effects and
programme costs there has been some shift away from expensive programmes like
class-room training to less expensive programmes like job training. Another important
lesson is that late intervention for groups marginalized in the labour market has small,
if any, effects. Whether this is due to wrong instrument choice or the difficulty of over-
coming barriers for this group cannot be settled from the empirical evidence. Irrespect-
ive of the reason this underscores the importance of early intervention to prevent that
passive unemployment spells become too long. An overall lesson on active labour mar-
ket policies from the Danish case it that the specific details of the content and structur-
ing of labour market programmes is crucial, and therefore there is a continuous
learning process in adjusting policies in light of experience, research and the labour
market situation.
On both theoretical and empirical grounds it is not clear whether there is a case for
strengthening or weakening ALMP with the business cycle situation. Job search may be
less distorted in a slump, and this implies that the role of ALMP in countering disin-
centive effects from e.g. unemployment insurance is less strong. On the other hand de-
preciation of human capital with the duration of unemployment spells calls for
intervention to restrain this process which eventually leads to an increase in the struc-
tural unemployment rate.7. Endnotes
1According to OECD data, Denmark has the highest expenditures on active labour
market programmes relative to GDP. In 2010 expenditures constituted 1.9% of GDP,
and before the crisis about 1.3% of GDP cf. www.oecd-ilibrary.org.
2The decrease in employment is roughly double the increase in the number of un-
employed, cf. Andersen (2012). The difference is accounted for by migrant workers, a
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crease in education).
3There are two explicit ways of adapting labour input to variations in need. One is
via a “time account” which stipulates that the average number of working hours should
be 37 hours per week over a certain period. This allows variation in hours without ne-
cessarily inducing overtime pay. About 2/3 of the workers in the main DA/LO-area is
on a contract with a “time account”. In addition there is a “work rotation” scheme
where working hours can be reduced and the workers can receive unemployment bene-
fits for the reduced hours. The standard period for a job rotation arrangement is 13
weeks. There was some expansion of the use of this scheme in 2008, but it has subse-
quently levelled off (www.jobindsats.dk).
4The maximal benefit level is regulated by i) the fact that the replacement rate rela-
tive to past wage income cannot exceed 90%, and ii) a nominal cap (indexed to wage
development). As a consequence the effective replacement rate is declining in the wage
and is on average about 65%. Benefit duration has been shortened over the years and
since 2011 it has been 2 years (2 ½ years). To remain eligible for unemployment bene-




7As mentioned earlier the Danish labour market system allocates unemployed into
three different groups.
8There is some recent work on business cycle dependent unemployment insurance,
see e.g. Andersen and Svarer (2011).
9In a recent cross-country study of the effects of structural reforms Bouis et al.
(2012) find that expenditures on ALMP going to either training or employment incen-
tives have no effects on the aggregate employment rate under favourable economic
conditions (boom), they both have a significant effect in a normal business cycle situ-
ation, and only employment incentives work under less favourable economic conditions
(slump).
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